The "Golden Dome": Space-Based Interceptors and Their Implications
ORAL · Invited
Abstract
The “Golden Dome” executive order mandates, among other things, development of a space-based system to defend the United States against nuclear-armed intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched by peer and near-peer adversaries, as well as adversaries with smaller and less sophisticated arsenals, by intercepting them during their boost phase. The proposal to develop a space-based boost-phase intercept (BPI) system is motivated by the serious countermeasures faced by midcourse intercept systems and the inability of land-, sea-, and air-based boost-phase interceptors to reach ICBMs in time from safe basing locations. But a space-based BPI system would be technically challenging, enormously expensive, fragile, and subject to countermeasures, as well as provocative and dangerous.
A fundamental challenge for any BPI system intended to defend against ICBMs is that the boost phases of solid-propellant ICBMs are very short—typically about 170 seconds—and the current ICBMs of potential adversaries would not need to use their full boost times to strike cities in the United States. An ICBM launched from the nearest missile base in Russia could strike Seattle by boosting only 150 seconds. And their boost phases could be made even shorter to defeat a BPI system. At the same time, a BPI system likely could not fire an interceptor even automatically until 45 seconds after a solid-propellant rocket begins its boost phase, and would usually need an additional 30 seconds or more to determine whether the rocket it has detected is indeed an ICBM on an attack trajectory.
A BPI system that allows only 30 seconds to assess the situation and assigns only one interceptor to each apparent target missile would have to have 4,000 orbiting interceptors to theoretically defend the continental United States against an attack by a single solid-propellant ICBM. To theoretically defend the continental United States against a salvo of 10 ICBMs would require 40,000 orbiting interceptors. Allowing more decision time would substantially increase the number of interceptors required. Such a system would require significant automation and have very limited decision-making time, increasing the risk that interceptors would be fired by mistake.
A fundamental challenge for any BPI system intended to defend against ICBMs is that the boost phases of solid-propellant ICBMs are very short—typically about 170 seconds—and the current ICBMs of potential adversaries would not need to use their full boost times to strike cities in the United States. An ICBM launched from the nearest missile base in Russia could strike Seattle by boosting only 150 seconds. And their boost phases could be made even shorter to defeat a BPI system. At the same time, a BPI system likely could not fire an interceptor even automatically until 45 seconds after a solid-propellant rocket begins its boost phase, and would usually need an additional 30 seconds or more to determine whether the rocket it has detected is indeed an ICBM on an attack trajectory.
A BPI system that allows only 30 seconds to assess the situation and assigns only one interceptor to each apparent target missile would have to have 4,000 orbiting interceptors to theoretically defend the continental United States against an attack by a single solid-propellant ICBM. To theoretically defend the continental United States against a salvo of 10 ICBMs would require 40,000 orbiting interceptors. Allowing more decision time would substantially increase the number of interceptors required. Such a system would require significant automation and have very limited decision-making time, increasing the risk that interceptors would be fired by mistake.
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Presenters
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Frederick K Lamb
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign